

## INCOMING TELEGRAM

## Department of State

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Action  
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED by RBDATE 3/9/83

FROM: Conakry

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 237, November 7, 7 p.m.

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References: (A) EMBTEL 236 (B) DEPTTEL 359 (C) EMBTEL 232.

Bowles and I called on Sekou Toure yesterday after political bureau meeting on Cuba and India. Also present were Saifoulaye Diallo, Beavogui, Alassane Diop and A. Diallo. Meeting lasted one hour fifteen minutes.

Bowles expressed our continued concern Soviet bases in Cuba which we insisting be dismantled under international supervision in view previous Soviet deception and lies about their existence. He stressed our hopes for firm settlement of crisis leading to possible wider agreement with Russians on disarmament and other issues. He asked Toure for his views and advice on how to deal with Castro problem once Soviet bases removed.

Toure obviously pleased by this question and stated there were three aspects to Cuban situation:

First, the Cuban revolution as an internal matter. Guinea believes every country had right decide own domestic policies and therefore supported Castro's right to carry out social revolution even if not in agreement with all he is doing.

Second aspect is relations between Cuba and other American states. Cuba has been wrong in trying to export its revolution to Latin America. And American states have been wrong in failing to distinguish between Cuba's domestic revolution and its efforts subversion abroad. Thus Cubans have come to believe that neighbors are opposed to their revolution per se and not only to their meddling. This

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-2- 237, November 7, 7 p.m. from Conakry

has made Cubans bitter, suspicious and uncompromising. Toure said Guineans went through same experience after independence when French press constantly attacked Guinea efforts to survive and sought turn other Africans against it.

Third aspect arose when Cuba declared itself a "socialist" state. This introduced big power cold war politics into situation and made settlement with other American states more difficult. So long Cuba clearly aligned with Soviet Bloc problem will be "eternalized".

Toure said he convinced Castro would prefer non-alignment. Castro certainly felt this way at their 1960 meeting. He even told Toure of his efforts prevent Communist take-over his movement. Since then "events and inexperience" have led him into Soviet camp. But experience of past few months have been education for him just as experience with Russians educational for Guineans. Therefore Toure believes opportunity exists for modus vivendi with Castro if we take up his offer negotiate our differences and are prepared to help him disengage economically from Soviet Bloc. Result could be Cuban swing back to neutralism.

Toure said we are at disadvantage in Cuban affair since appearance big country bullying small country arouses sympathy for underdog even if big country has good case. Therefore we must clearly separate our actions against Soviet bases (which will have support of neutrals) from actions against Cuba which will not be understood.

Toure said in general US is strong position all over Africa and Asia because we have no colonial past and people do not suspect us of imperialist designs. Our biggest handicap is misuse our aid in past to prop up unpopular regimes which has made our efforts counter productive.

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-3- 237, November 7, 7 p.m. from Conakry

Bowles replied he could agree with much of what Toure said. However we would insist on two preconditions for accommodation with Cuba: Elimination with inspection of all Soviet military installations and firm commitment by Castro not to play Soviet game by meddling in affairs other American states. He described goals of Alliance for Progress and said if Castro sincere about wanting social and economic reform in Latin America he should support and not try sabotage our efforts.

Bowles cited our aid to India as example our desire build viable societies even in countries which do not always agree with us but which making serious effort. He suggested Chinese attack aimed at slowing Indian economic progress. He concluded with exposition our foreign policy objectives pointing out our military strength necessary to enable countries like Guinea to develop and grow in peace.

Communique reported in REFTEL (A) not yet issued at time meeting and REFTEL (B) not received. However GOG position on Guantanamo made clear by Toure in REFTEL (C).

At conclusion Toure and Diop both expressed satisfaction USAID program here but deplored slowness execution. Said however they appreciated paper work necessary to avoid mistakes and waste.

Talk was extremely warm and cordial and frankness as usual much appreciated by Toure. A. Diallo later said he thought meeting "extremely useful".

ATTWOOD

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